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is an open question as to whether such a 
structure might have had any impact upon 
the conduct of the current pensions mis- 
selling difficulties.
International co-ordination
Contemporaneously with the launch of 
the new regulator a memorandum of 
understanding was announced between the 
SEC and the Commodities and Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) (which 
regulate the US securities and derivatives 
markets respectively) and the Bank of 
England and the new regulator. This is a 
very important development, since 
regulatory co-ordination between the US 
and UK regulators is of great importance 
to the industry and also suggests that SEC 
and CFTC have been to some extent
involved in the planning process for the 
new regulator, since it is unlikely that they 
would have agreed such a memorandum of 
understanding with an unknown body. It is 
important, and very welcome, that the 
process of reform in the UK should begin 
with a vote of confidence from the US.
BANK OF ENGLAND 
RESTRUCTURE
Simultaneously with the publication of the 
documents relating to the new regulator, the 
government published a Bank of England 
Bill, to implement the restructuring of the 
Bank of England. The Court of Directors of 
the Bank will continue in place; however, a 
statutory Monetary Policy Committee will be 
established which will be responsible for the 
design and implementation of the Bank's
monetary policy.
The Monetary Policy Committee is given 
statutory objectives. These are:
'To maintain price stability and, subject to that, 
to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's 
Government, including its objectives for growth and 
employment'.
This formulation, in particular the use of 
the words 'subject to that', appears to go a 
very long way towards giving the Bank an 
overriding statutory obligation to combat 
inflation, a requirement which is widely 
viewed as being at the core of central bank 
independence. ©
Simon Gleeson
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Only five years after the United Nations 
was established, a comprehensive text on 
the law of the UN had already been 
written, by Hans Kelsen. In his Preface on 
Interpretation Kelsen stated that:
'... [sjince the law is formulated in words 
and words have frequently more than one 
meaning, interpretation of the law, that is 
determination of its meaning, becomes 
necessary' (The Law of the United Nations, ed. G 
W Keeton & G Schwar/enberger, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd, London, 1951at p. (xiii))
and that:
'... it is considered to be the specific 
function of interpretation to find and establish 
the one, "true" meaning of a legal norm.'
However, he continued, 'there is almost 
always a possible interpretation different 
from that adopted by [a] law applying 
organ in a concrete case.' In this context, 
Kelsen concluded that 'law' as a 'means', is 
in reality subordinated to 'polities' as an 
'end' and, in that context:
'... the choice of interpretation as a law- 
making act is determined by political motives. It 
is not the logically 'true', it is the politically 
preferable meaning of the interpreted norm 
which becomes binding' (at p. xv).
In the context of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), this difference 
between juridical and political acts is not
as clear that which Kelsen suggests for the
oo
UN. However, it is believed that within 
the context of the WTO law-making and 
law-applying institutions, the decisions of 
the latter are to be 'guided' to a certain 
extent by the 'practice' determined by the 
former; although the latter do 
complement and can set 'precedents' for 
the actions of the former. This assertion 
can be illustrated by an exploration of the 
WTO constitutional structure
WTO CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE
Within the WTO both the 'political' 
and the 'judicial' bodies are constantly 
faced with interpretative tasks. Within the 
trade/environment discussion, the 
problems relating to interpretation are 
particularly significant, specifically with 
regards to the balance between the values 
and principles of both fields. In the 
GATT/WTO context, this discussion has 
been acquiring greater relevance. It is 
considered necessary that the WTO 
system take a more determined 
'environmental' approach. Following 
Kelsen's arguments, it is believed that for 
that to happen in a 'juridically certain' way, 
the WTO 'political' body will be the body 
which will need to adopt this approach as 
the 'end' to reach. It seems then that the 
adoption of waivers, interpretative
decisions, or treaty amendments (for 
details see art. IX and X of the A'larrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter WTO Charter)), 
by the WTO Members will be a possible 
answer. Nevertheless, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) - motivated by 
the panels and Appellate Body (AB)   may 
decide to reach the 'finishing line' in 
advance of this.
WTO POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL 
BODIES
In the spirit of establishing a functional 
distinction, the WTO 'political' body can be 
deemed to be the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council (however they act), while 
the WTO panels and Appellate Body can be 
considered as the WTO 'juridical' or 'judicial' 
body
WHO INTERPRETS EAW?
Within the constitutional structure of 
the WTO, there are different bodies 
whose functions relate to the task of 
interpreting the law. The Ministerial 
Conference (MC) and the General 
Council (GC) have wide powers of 
interpretation; the DSB a more restricted 
one. In relation to this, the WTO Charter
provides that both the MC and GC have 
the 'exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of [the Agreements which 
form part of the WTO]' (art. IX(2), WTO 
Charter). On the other hand, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
provides that the:
'... [Recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB [(including the interpreting function)] 
cannot add or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the [agreements]' (art. 
3(2), DSU)
and that:
'... [t]he provisions of the Understanding 
are without prejudice to the rights oj Members 
to seek authoritative interpretation [by the MC 
and GC] ojprovisions of a covered agreement 
through decision-making under the WTO' ( 
art. 3(9), DSU).
An important distinction is the 
following. On the one hand the panels and 
AB are de Jacto juridical organs whose 
dispute settlement reports need, however, 
to be adopted by the DSB, formed by the 
GC. In this context, when the GC acts as 
DSB, applying the DSU rules, its limited 
interpretative functions come into play. 
Similarly, when the GC (and MC) act 
pursuant to art. IX of the WTO Charter, 
undertaking its interpretative or waiver- 
granting function, or treaty amendment 
(pursuant to art. X), the wider powers 
apply, subject to specific rules of 
procedure applicable to each case (see art. 
IX and X, WTO Charter; also art. 2(4), 
DSU). Bearing these in mind, it is 
possible to conclude that the 'political' 
body (i.e., the GC and MC, however they 
act) has certain 'pre-eminence' over the de 
facto 'judicial' organ (i.e., panels and AB).
Within the WTO constitutional 
structure there are four possible ways in 
which an 'environmental' approach could 
be undertaken:
  The DSB   in both its 'juridical' and 
'political' phases  , acting on a case-by- 
case basis and subject to its limited 
interpretative powers, can consider a 
trade-restrictive measure based on 
certain environmental standards as 
covered by GATT/WTO's art. XX(b) or 
(g) exceptions;
  the MC and GC can undertake their 
interpretative role pursuant art. IX(2) 
with wide powers to include certain 
environmental standards in the 
exceptions covered by art. XX(b) and
(g);
  the MC can undertake its waiver- 
granting function pursuant to art. IX(3)
and (4), and include certain 
environmental measures as non- 
violatory of GATT/WTO law; and
  pursuant to art. X, the MC can 
undertake treaty-law amendments 
extending (or clarifying) the wording of 
art. XX exceptions, in order to include 
specific 'environmental' parameters.
Clearly the scope of the effects of each 
of these choices varies: the DSB decisions 
have ad hoc effects, while the MC and GC 
decisions have more holistic effects. It is 
still not very clear whether   and in what 
measure   the DSB will influence and set 
parameters for the MC and GC decision- 
making functions regarding a possible 
future environmental approach. It is 
believed that subsequent WTO practice 
will provide the answer.
JURISPRUDENTIAL 
APPROACHES
There have been some previous 
'interpretative' jurisprudential approaches 
relevant to the trade-environment 
discussion. In these, the dispute 
settlement organs have had to confront the 
difficult task of interpreting treaty 
wording, specifically, that of art. XX(b) 
and (g) of the GATT (WTO, The Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations; The Legal Texts, GATT 
Secretariat, June 1994, p. 519). Within 
the vast number of cases already carried 
out by the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, there are some 
useful examples in which relevant 
interpretative problems have found 
'jurisprudential' importance for the 
environmental sphere.
The meaning of the word 'necessary' 
within art. XX(b) has been defined by 
previous GATT/WTO Panels on more or 
less consistent grounds. In 1990 it was 
established that for a trade-restrictive 
measure to be covered by that exception 
and, therefore, to be admitted as a valid 
restriction to trade, it had to be the 'least 
restrictive alternative' available. In the Thai 
Cigarettes case of that year, the Panel noted 
that:
"... the import restrictions imposed by
Thailand could be considered to be 'necessan7 '>
... only if there were no alternative measure 
consistent with the General Agreement, or less 
inconsistent with it, which Thailand could 
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its 
health policy objectives.' (Thailand- Restrictions 
on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, Report of the Panel adopted 7 
November 1990 (DS10/R), at para. 75).
In this case, the Report makes reference
to a previous panel approach regarding the 
term 'necessary' in the context of art. 
XX(d) (at para. 74 of the Report.) 
According to the Panel's remarks Thailand
o
could have employed other measures less 
inconsistent with the Agreement (P Sands, 
Principles of International Environmental Law, 
Vol. 1, Manchester University7 Press, UK, 
1995, p. 6934).
In 1991 the GATT Panel interpreted 
the word 'necessary' more broadly than 
previous panels, including in its meaning 
requirements such as predictability', 
unavoidability, non-discrimination and the 
use of measures non extra-jurisdictionally. 
The unadopted Report of the Mexican Tuna 
case of 1991 made reference to the 
previous Thai Cigarettes case and went even 
further, stating that even when an import 
prohibition is the only measure reasonably 
available:
'... the conditions adopted were too 
unpredictable to be regarded as necessary to 
protect the health or life of dolphins'(P Sands, 
at p. 697).
Furthermore, the Panel held that 
accepting the extra-jurisdictional 
application of the US measures would 
deviate from the purpose of the GATT.
The GATT/WTO Panels have also 
considered the definition of the wording
o
'relating to'. Initially, for a trade-restrictive 
measure to be covered by the art. XX(g) 
exception, it had to be 'primarily aimed at 
the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource'. In the Mexican Tuna case the 
Panel adopted this view and rejected the 
US argument on the same grounds, more 
or less, as for the analysis of the 'necessity' 
of the measure. A detailed analysis of the 
Panel Report can be found at US 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna', Report of the 
Panel (DS21/R). See also Sands, at p. 697 
and Arthur Appleton, GATT Article XX's 
Chapeau: A Disguised 'Necessary' Test? and the 
WTO Appellate Body's Ruling in United 
States v Standards Jor Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 6(2) RECIEL (1997), 
at p. 131.
Most recently the WTO DSB has given 
a broader meaning to the term in the 
Reformulated Gasoline case of 1996 
(Appleton has already noted this approach 
by the WTO Appellate Body) (but without 
repudiating the earlier approach). In this 
case the Appellate Body found that:
'... given th[e] substantial relationship, the 
baseline establishment rules [(the measure in 
question)] cannot be regarded as merely 
incidentally or inadvertently aimed at the 
conservation of clean air in the US for the
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purposes of Article XX(g).' (United States   
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, at 
http://vwwv.vvto.org/wto/clispute/gasoline. 
wp5).
As Appleton pointed out, this new- 
approach 'might constitute a 
reinterprctation of what "primarily 
aimed at" means, and how the "relating 
to" test is to be applied' (at p. 132). In 
other words:
'... [ijfthe relationship between the trade 
measure at issue and the stated conservation 
goal is "substantial", the "relating to" 
requirement would be satisfied. A measure that 
is "merely, incidentally or inadvertently"aimed 
at the conservation oj an exhaustible natural 
resource would not satisfy this requirement.'
THE EXTENT OF 
INTERPRETATION
In cases such as the 1991 Mexican Tuna 
case, the measures in dispute had been 
applied unilaterally outside the 
framework of a binding international
o
environmental agreement. The relevant 
question now is whether a trade- 
restrictive measure   prima facie contrary 
to GATT/WTO rules   applied pursuant 
to an international environmental 
agreement can be understood as covered 
by art. XX(b) or (g)) exceptions. Ernst- 
Ulrich Petersmann has expressed the 
view that as far as the relations among 
parties to an environmental agreement is 
concerned, art. XX may 'not stand in the
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way of measures which are 
internationally agreed to be 'necessary'
J O J
for protecting life, health or 'exhaustible 
natural resources' in the parties to such 
an agreement' ('International Trade Law 
and International Environmental Law; 
Prevention and Settlement of 
International Environmental Disputes in 
GATT, 17(1) Journal of World Trade Law
(1993), p. 71). Moreover, it has been said 
that:
'... if environmental standards recognized as 
'necessary' in such inter se agreements become 
general 'GATTpractice', they might also be of 
legal relevance jor the interpretation oj Article 
XX vis-a-vis third GATT Member 
countries...'(Petersmann, at p. 71).
The question   currently debated in a 
WTO Panel in the Shrimp/Turtle case   
poses, nonetheless, difficult interpretative 
problems of both GATT/WTO law, and 
of general international law. Furthermore, 
the constitutional limitations to the DSB 
interpretative functions may also become 
relevant   as long as rights of members 
may be affected   leaving the decision for 
consideration of the WTO 'political' 
body through its decision-making
- o o
faculties.
CONCLUSIONS
The extent of the interpretative 
function varies within the WTO system. It 
would seem that the WTO 'political' body 
has both constitutional and functional 
tools for including environmental 
standards in WTO practice, with holistic 
effects. The DSB seems more limited in 
this respect. Nonetheless, the 'political' 
body also has important limitations. As T J 
Shoenbaum pointed out, the work of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) 'does little to inspire confidence 
that the CTE will be able to formulate 
concrete recommendations for 
reconciling the important 
issues at stake' 
('International Trade and 
Protection of the 
Environment: The 
Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation', 91(2) 
AJIL (1997), at p. 269); 
and that:
'... [t]he difficulty the 
CTE has had in coming to a 
decision can be attributed in 
part to the decision-making 
process of the WTO' (at 
p.270).
For those reasons, it seems then that the 
clear current alternative for including 
environmental standards in the WTO 
practice is, today, that of action by the 
DSB, where adoption of reports is easier 
to reach due to the 'negative consensus' 
formula. If true that this approach would 
only have ad hoc effects, and that it would 
be subject to the interpretative limitations
THE SHRIMP/TURTLE CASE
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, since the process of 
harvesting shrimp harms an internationally 
recognised endangered species both by treaty 
law (CITES) and probably by customary law 
(see J Cameron, F Darroch et al, ttWWAmicus 
Brief to WTO Shrimp-Turtle Dispute, ed, C Arden- 
Clarke, WWF, September 1997, at p. 1327), 
it has been argued that the Panel should 
consider this as sufficient grounds for 
accepting environmental standards as non- 
violatory of GATT/WTO law. This, however, 
seems unlikely to happen. Nonetheless, the 
Panel may still set an important precedent if it 
agrees to refer the case for analysis by a group 
of experts. When this article went to press, 
the Report of the Panel had not been issued.
detailed above, it is believed that it can set 
a clear precedent to the 'political' body, 
where holistic approaches could be taken, 
and where different levels of development 
and trade interests exist. Furthermore, 
this could also open the door for the DSB 
and the parties to the WTO to deal with 
other important international 
environmental problems, such as those 
covered by global instruments on the 
danger to the Earth's ozone layer 
(Montreal Protocol), the trade in 
endangered species (CITES), toxic waste 
(Basle Convention), climate change 
(UNFCCC), etc.
Finally, it is important not to forget that:
'... [djispute settlement procedures assist in 
making rules effective, adding an essential 
measure of predictability and effectiveness to the 
operation of a rule oriented system in the 
otherwise relatively weak realm of international 
norms.' (J H Jackson, S P Croley, 'WTO 
Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, 
and Deference to National 
Governments', 90 AJIL (1996), p. 193)
Dispute settlement also assists in 
achieving the aims of justice, ensuring
judicial certainty and, therefore, confidence
. . . /. /%in international interaction. *&
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